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REFORM OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION PROSECUTION LAWS

As previously discussed in Part One of this article, a multitude
of procedural and practical limitations greatly hinder the ability of
state investigative and prosecutive authorities in West Virginia to combat public corruption. On the national level, the increased role of the
federal government in the prosecution of public corruption establishes
that similar restrictions exist in other states as well. When public
corruption persists unchecked, it erodes the public's confidence in
those charged to govern them. The tools employed and the penalties
imposed by the federal government to prosecute these cases, however,
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vary in application and interpretation. The hodgepodge of statutes
and their divergent application lead to uncertainty for federal prosecutors and the public. The authors believe that the solution lies in
the passage of one federal public corruption statute which would be
utilized in most cases. Further, state reform would allow state authorities to shoulder part of the responsibility for addressing the problem of public corruption.
A.

Federal Statutory Reform

Federal reform should be undertaken to define, in one statute,
corrupt behavior by public officials. The fundamental deficit in the
federal prosecution of corrupt state and local officials is the necessary
reliance by federal prosecutors on a collection of statutes that are not
sufficiently comprehensive and, in many areas, unclear. This problem
is exacerbated by the important but competing policy concerns presented when courts attempt to construe the statutes. In each case the
court must attempt to balance anew the Congressional goal of eliminating state and local public corruption with the need to construe
such statutes narrowly due to federalism concerns. This conflict was
present when the Supreme Court decided McNally v. United States'
and McCormick v. United States,2 with federalism concerns prevailing. The dilemma was again present last term in the Supreme Court
in Evans v. United States.3
In addition to the federalism concern, the Court in Evans addressed issues of statutory construction (i.e., criminal statutes must
be construed narrowly under the rule of lenity) and the role of precedent (long held majority opinions of the circuit courts deserve deference). The dissent also raised a more general public policy question:
the need to control public corruption versus the need to prevent prosecutorial abuse.4 While the opinions in Evans address each of these

1. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991).
3. 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
4. In McNally, Justice Stevens raised the policy issue in his dissent that the class of defendants
- white collar public officials - that benefits from the McNally opinion includes those least in need
of help. Justice Thomas, dissenting from Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Evans, presumably was
responding in kind when he raised the issue of the need to avoid "discrimination" in the prosecution
of public corruption cases.
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concerns, the holding does not, and probably could not, completely
resolve the underlying problem presented by these tensions. Rather,
at best, the case resolves the split in the circuit courts relating to
5
whether there is an "inducement" requirement under the Hobbs Act.
The Court concludes that, as applied to public officials, there is no
such requirement in the statute.6
Evans was a DeKalb County Commissioner who took an $8,000
"campaign contribution" offered to him by an undercover agent purportedly seeking a favorable zoning decision. The Court held that
"inducement" (some action or demand by Evans) was not an element
of the offense. 7 Rather, a public official who simply accepts a "bribe"
is guilty under the Hobbs Act.8 On the other hand, not every payment
to a public official would violate the Hobbs Act. 9 The payment must
be "under color of official right." 10 Presumably this means that payments made for a purely private reason with no corrupt motive, such
as birthday presents between family members, would not be a violation of the law. Evans, therefore, settled the two extremes - bribes
and purely private transactions - but did not seek to address some
potentially difficult questions that remain.
The clearest remaining issue is the status of those payments typically called "gratuities" - a gift that, while only given because the
person is a public official, is in fact simply a gift. In this circumstance,
no specific benefit or public action is necessarily expected when a
gratuity is given. One example might be the unanticipated payment
by a business to a public official after he acts in the business' favor.
The criminality of other goodwill-type payments under the Hobbs
Act is also not made clear by Evans.
Prior to Evans, the language of the circuit courts' decisions purportedly affirmed in Evans would include "gratuities" as Hobbs Act
violations. In fact, any payment motivated by the defendant's public
5.18 U.S.C § 1951 (1988).
6. Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1883.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1885.
9. Id. at 1884.
10. Id. at 1883.
11. Id. at 1884 n. 2.
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office is prosecutable under these cases.' 2 However, the literal terms
of the Evans opinion are far less clear. Under Evans, a payment
motivated by the public office is prosecutable "when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts."' 3 While it would be reasonable to conclude that
Evans did not result in a wholesale reversal of the circuit court cases
it purported to follow, some ambiguity was raised by the Court in
its choice of the phrase "specific action" rather than the more general
term - "public position" or "recipient's office."
While Evans may have injected some ambiguity in one area, it
also clarified McCormick. In McCormick, the Court held that the
United States must show an "explicit promise or undertaking" for
4
a Hobbs Act conviction for extortion of campaign contributions. It
was unclear whether "explicit" modified only "promise" or also
"undertaking." If the requirement was that everything be explicit
between the individual paying a bribe in the form of a campaign
contribution and the public official who received it, creative wrongdoers could have a field day avoiding the statute. 5 Evans, which was
also a campaign contribution case, does not apply the "explicit promise or undertaking" test, but instead talks in terms of quidpro quo.
In addition, the jury instructions affirmed in Evans contained no
requirement of an "explicit undertaking," but instead permitted conviction when there is an agreement, explicit or otherwise, to perform
specific official acts for payment. 6 Consequently, Evans clarified that
a literal interpretation of the "explicit undertaking" requirement in
McCormick was not intended.
It is apparent that a slow evolution and, perhaps, clarification of
federal corruption statutes is underway. For example, over the last
five years the "intangible request to good government" theory was

12. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 1979) ("So long as the mo-

tivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls within the ambit of 18
U.S.C § 1951.") (citing United States v. Brasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1975).
13.
14.
15.
16.

Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1889.
McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1816 (1991).
Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1892 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1889.
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rejected in McNally and replaced by an "intangible right to honest
services" theory by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Thereafter, the
"explicit promise or undertaking" requirement imposed in McCormick was later replaced with a quidpro quo requirement in Evans.
Also in Evans inducement was found unnecessary; but the scope and
applicability of the quid pro quo requirement was left unclear. Consequently, there remains a need for a clear, comprehensive federal
statute criminalizing state and local public corruption.
The proposed federal corruption statute should not be written so
broadly as to criminalize all suspect behavior but rather should employ language developed through case law for existing statutes. Thus,
the chance deficiencies resulting from employing statutes originally
enacted to address problems other than public corruption could be
eliminated. Similarly, adoption of current language will serve to place
public officials on notice that certain conduct will or will not constitute a criminal offense. Finally, the statute should be jurisdictionally based on the Commerce Clause, Mail Power and the receipt of
federal monies. Consequently, the statute's jurisdictional basis would
be time tested.
As one single statute becomes the primary statute relied upon by
federal prosecutors to prosecute public corruption, a body of law will
quickly develop upon which future conduct can more accurately be
predicated. Further, the passage of a single statute will lend stability
to what is now an ever evolving state of the law. Moreover, should
Congress decide that such a statute is not being interpreted as intended, then only one statute, rather than a multitude, would need
to be amended.
To this end, the United States Senate passed in 1989, 1990 and
1991, an anti-corruption statute designed to clearly delineate criminal
conduct under one umbrella statute. 17 The 1991 version reads as follows:

17. 135 Cong. Rec. 12430 (1989); 136 Cong. Rec. 6639 (1990); 137 Cong. Rec. 9382 (1991).
In each of these years the House of Representatives did not pass the Senate version or any similar
proposal. In 1992, the "Anti-Corruption Act of 1992" was offered as an amendment to bill S. 250,
but it did not pass. 138 Cong. Rec. 6911 (1992).
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TITLE XLVIII PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Sec. 4801. Short Title
This title may be cited as the "Anti-Corruption Act of 1991."
Sec. 4802. Offense
Chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new section:
§ 226. Public corruption
(a) Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (d), deprives or defrauds, or endeavors to deprive or to defraud, by any scheme or artifice, the inhabitants of a State or political subdivision of a State of the honest services of an
official or employee of such State, or political subdivision of a State, shall be fined
under this title, or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (d), deprives or defrauds, or endeavors to deprive or to defraud, by any scheme or artifice, the inhabitants of a State or political subdivision of a State of a fair and impartially
conducted election process in any primary, run-off, special or general election (1) through the procurement, casting, or tabulation of ballots that are materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent or that are invalid, under the laws of the State in
which the election is held;
(2) through paying or offering to pay any person for voting;
(3) through the procurement or submission of voter registrations that contain
false material information, or omit material information; or
(4) through the filing of any report required to be filed under State law regarding an election campaign that contains false material information or omits material information shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than
ten years, or both.
(c)Whoever, being a public official or an official or employee of a State, or
political subdivision of a State, in a circumstance described in subsection (d), deprives or defrauds or endeavors to deprive or to defraud, by any scheme or artifice,
the inhabitants of a State or political subdivision of a State of the right to have
the affairs of the State or political subdivision conducted on the basis of complete,
true, and accurate material information, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
for not more than 10 years, or both.
(d) The circumstances referred to in subsections (a), (b), and (c) are that
(1) for the purpose of executing or concealing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, the person so doing
(A) places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered
by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed
to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing;
(B) transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds;
(C) transports or causes to be transported any person or thing, or induces any
person to travel in or to be transported in, interstate or foreign commerce; or
(D) uses or causes to use of any facility of interstate or foreign commerce;
(2) the scheme or artifice affects or constitutes an attempt to affect in any
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manner or degree, or would if executed or concealed so affect, interstate or foreign
commerce; or
(3) as applied to an offense under subsection (b), an objective of the scheme
or artifice is to secure the election of an official who, if elected, would have some
authority over the administration of funds derived from an Act of Congress totaling
$10,000 or more during the 12-month period immediately preceding or following
the election or date of the offense.
(e) Whoever deprives or defrauds, or endeavors to deprive or to defraud, by
any scheme or artifice, the inhabitants of the United States of the honest services
of a public official or person who has been selected to be a public official shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
(f) Whoever being an official, or public official, or person who has been selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, discharges, demotes, suspends,
threatens, harasses, or, in any manner, discriminates against any employee or official
of the United States or any State or political subdivision of such State, or endeavors
to do so, in order to carry out or to conceal any scheme or artifice described in
this section, shall be fined under this title or subject to imprisonment of up to 5
years, or both.
(g)(1) Any employee or official of the United States or any State or political
subdivision of such State who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against because of lawful acts done
by the employee as a result of a violation of subsection (e) or because of actions
by the employee on behalf of himself or others in furtherance of a prosection under
this section (including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance
in such a prosecution) may in a civil action, obtain all relief necessary to make
such individual whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with the same seniority
status such individual would have had but for the discrimination, 3 times the amount
of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages
sustained as a result of the discrimination, including reasonable litigation costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees.
(2) An individual is not eligible for such relief if that individual participated
in the violation of this section with respect to which such relief would be awarded.
(3) A civil action or proceeding authorized by this subsection shall be stayed
by a court upon the certification of an attorney for the Government, stating that
such action or proceeding may adversely affect the interests of the Government in
an ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding. The attorney for the Government
shall promptly notify the court when the stay may be lifted with such adverse affects.
(h) For purposes of this section
(1) the term "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the
United States;
(2) the terms "public official" and "person who has been selected to be a
public official" have the meaning set forth in section 201 of this title; the terms
"public official" and "person who has been selected to be a public official" shall
also include any person acting or pretending to act under color of official authority.
(3) the term "official" includes
(A) any person employed by, exercising any authority derived from, or holding
any position in the government of a State or any subdivision of the executive,
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legislative, judicial, or other branch of government thereof, including a department,
independent establishment, commission, administration, authority board, and bureau, and a corporation or other legal entity established and subject to control by
a government or governments for the execution of a governmental or intergovernmental program;
(B) any person acting or pretending to act under color of official authority;
and
(C) includes any person who has been nominated, appointed or selected to be
an official or who has been officially informed that he or she will be so nominated,
appointed or selected.
(4) the term "under color of official authority" includes any person who represents that he or she controls, is an agent of, or otherwise acts on behalf of an
official, public official, and person who has been selected to be a public official;
and
(5) the term "uses any facility of interstate or foreign commerce" includes the
intrastate use of any facility that may also be used in interstate or foreign commerce.
Sec. 4803. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) Table of Sections. The table of sections for chapter 11 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following item.
226. Public Corruption.
(b) RICO Section 1961(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting "section 226 (relating to public corruption)" after "section 224 (relating to
sports bribery)."
(c) Interruption of Communications. Section 2516(1)(c) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting "section 226 (relating to public corruption)" after
"section 224 (bribery in sporting contests)."
Sec. 4804. INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
(a) In General Section 1343 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
(1) striking "transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio,
or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs,
signals, pictures, or sounds" and inserting "uses or causes to be used any facility
of interstate or foreign commerce"; and
(2) inserting "or attempting to do so" after "for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice."
(b) Conforming Amendments (1) The heading of section 1343 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by striking "fraud by wire, radio, or telephone" and
inserting "Fraud by use of facility of interstate commerce."
(2) The chapter analysis for chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by striking the analysis for section 1343 and inserting the following:
"1343. Fraud by use of facility of interstate commerce."

Foremost, this statute would expand the mail and wire fraud statutes
to include any use of any facility involved in interstate commerce
and, perhaps more importantly, any scheme simply affecting interstate
commerce. Consequently, the statute would eliminate prosecution depending on the fortuity of the use of the mails or interstate wire
transactions. Schemes employing the use of Federal Express or having
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a de minimis effect on interstate commerce would be prosecutable
alongside those cases previously limited to use of the mails or interstate wire transactions. Thus, the more savvy public officials, who
intentionally hand deliver documents in furtherance of their schemes
to avoid federal prosecution, would be prosecuted alongside the less
informed criminal who chooses to place a 29 cent stamp on them
and drop them in the mail. In the broad scheme of things, the person
who knows how to evade federal prosecution is probably a greater
threat to society and consequently more worthy of prosecution than
his less sophisticated counterpart.
Moreover, the proposed statute would embody the case law developed under 18 U.S.C §§ 1341 & 1343 (1988) and thus place public
officials on notice that it is Congress' intent to criminalize conduct
that the courts have already determined to be violations of the mail
and wire fraud statutes in all cases where an effect on interstate commerce occurs.
Significantly, the proposed bill incorporates the more expansive
language contained in the McNally fix, criminalizing schemes which
defraud the citizenry of honest services and not just property. Consequently, all of the pre-McNally case law defining this clause would
be viable under this statute.
Furthermore, the definition of "official" includes not only those
holding office, but also those recently elected to office, those seeking
office, those nominated or appointed to office, those claiming to
speak for public officials, and those pretending to exercise the power
of public officials. In this way, not only would prosecution of the
public official himself be possible but those holding themselves out
as public officials would be prosecutable as well. Thus, power brokers, political bosses, sycophants, and charlatans would be subject
to prosecution just as the public official who abuses the public's trust
isprosecuted.
The more definitive change of the proposed statute is found in
§ 226(b), however, which would clearly delineate the role of the federal government in the prosecution of election offenses. Under current
law, prosecution of election crimes depends on a variety of arcane
and seemingly obscure limitations. Foremost is the requirement lim-
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iting jurisdiction to those elections where a federal candidate is on
the ballot although the criminal activity need not have any relation
to the federal candidate. Yet there is no greater threat to the constitutional guarantee to a republican form of government than election
crimes which subvert the electoral process. In contrast, § 226(b) would
permit federal prosecution of persons who use any interstate facility
or affect interstate commerce by engaging in conduct that violates
states law through buying votes, submitting false voter registrations,
filing false campaign reports, and the like. Section 226(d)(3) also provides for prosecution of such schemes whose object is to elect a person
to an office which has "some authority" over at least $10,000 in
federal funds in the twelve month period before or after the election.
In addition to clarifying the role of the federal government in election
offenses in general, § 226(b) would eliminate any lingering debate
that the McNally fix did not restore the power of the federal government to prosecute those who submit false campaign reports. Prior
to McNally such prosecutions were permissible under the Curry line
of cases. False campaign prosecutions have been brought under the
theory that the public official sought to defraud the citizens of their
right to pay salaries to honestly elected officials. Although some might
argue that such prosecutions are impermissible under McNally, § 226(b)
would eliminate this debate.
Another significant change contained in the proposed statute is
found in § 226(h)(5) which defines "uses any facility of interstate or
foreign commerce" to include the "intrastate use of any facility that
may also be used in interstate or foreign commerce." Under current
law, jurisdiction under the mail fraud statute"8 can be based on an
intrastate mailing but the wire fraud statute 9 requires an interstate
mailing. Thus, not only would the proposed statute expand jurisdiction to any use of an interstate facility but further to any intrastate
use of that facility.
Clearly, the proposed statute would go far in delineating the federal role in corruption and election offenses. Moreover, it would eliminate many of the chance deficiencies existing in the various statutes
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
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currently employed by federal prosecutors to combat public corruption. Finally, the proposed statute would stabilize this very important
area of the law. In addition to efforts on the federal level, individual
states need to introduce reforms to facilitate prosecution of public
corruption.
B. Possible State Responses
There are several steps the State of West Virginia should take to
better enable county prosecutors to-effectively pursue public corruption investigations. As outlined in Part One of this Article, county
prosecutors are hampered by several seemingly unjustifiable anomalies
in the State criminal law. Each of these impediments could be corrected legislatively. Two of these problems have to do with the grand
jury system. Corruption investigations differ from most investigations
conducted by agencies of the State in that they often require an aggressive use of the grand jury. In a typical street crime investigation,
witnesses are usually interviewed by the investigating officer who then
submits a completed investigative report to the prosecutor. Corruption
investigations, on the other hand, truly develop before the grand jury.
Often, key witnesses in corruption investigations are wedged between
what they perceive to be two sovereigns: the prosecuting attorney and
the office-holder targeted by the investigation. Many such witnesses
will align with the power whom they believe is most potent or most
real. The decision a witness in such an unenviable position makes
may be quite cynical: do I have more to fear in telling the truth and
implicating my boss or in lying to the grand jury? Thus, the grand
jury must be employed as, and be perceived by the witness as, an
entity with both authority and power. Frequently federal investigators
advise a witness suspected of having loyalty to the target that she
faces felony prosecution if she fails to be truthful to the grand jury.
The State .prosecutor does not have that leverage: the statute outlawing lying to a grand jury is only a misdemeanor. 20 Misdemeanor
convictions rarely result in jail sentences, they do not carry the stigma
of a felony, they do not result in the permanent loss of any civil
right; and a one-year statute of limitations applies. 21 They resemble
20. W. VA. CODE § 61-5-2 (1989).
21. W. VA. CODE § 61-11-9 (1989).
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a traffic offense more than a crime involving scienter. Thus, the cynic's decision in a State grand jury situation is often far too easy. The
power his boss wields over him is quite real: his job most probably
will hang in the balance, his boss may threaten to expose the skeletons
in the witness's closet, and there may be a quite reasonable fear of
more violent retaliation. The potential of a misdemeanor convictionand it is only a potential, somebody else must talk before the prosecution can raise even a misdemeanor case-looks like a stroll in the
park compared to the horrors the target of the grand jury may work
on the witness.
Throughout our experience we have been impressed with the
heightened seriousness with which federal courts take crimes that have
as their victim the system of justice: obstruction of justice, perjury,
and jury tampering. Judges typically address such crimes with a disdain and, indeed, alarm that reveals an acute awareness of the vulnerability of the justice system and its dependence on a respect for
its institutions and workings. These crimes strike at the very heart
of the justice system - they threaten our ability to effectively govern
ourselves. Such schemes, if successful, not only untrack the particular
case at which they were aimed, but also undermine general public
trust in the administration of justice and foster cynicism about government.
How then can a mere misdemeanor penalty for lying to a grand
jury, the public's main tool for penetrating government corruption,
be justified? Although one might fear a vindictive and reckless prosecutor, not even such a prosecutor can obtain a conviction without
convincing twelve of the defendant's peers of the righteousness of his
case. Furthermore, the trial court inevitably provides some check
against a careless or baseless criminal charge.
Defining perjury before a grand jury as a mere misdemeanor invites a cavalier attitude toward its proceedings. The state in effect,
joins the chorus saying that while federal grand jury proceedings must
be taken seriously, state grand juries are second-class citizens and are
not to be taken as seriously.
The State could express how seriously it regards perjury before
a grand jury by simply increasing the statutory maximum jail term
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and the applicable statute-of-limitations to a several-year period. Inasmuch as this penalty could be announced to grand jury witnesses
after they are given the oath, the legislature's message would be heard
loud and clear by those who need to hear it. We believe that the
state grand jury process would thereby be greatly strengthened. This
strengthening would in turn empower county prosecutors to use the
grand jury as a tool for advancing corruption investigations.
Secondly, a substantial question exists as to whether West Virginia
law prohibits prosecutors from using a defendant's grand jury testimony against him, regardless of whether or not the defendant requested immunity. 2 Typically, early in an investigation a public official
appears before a grand jury to explain away some circumstances which
appear sinister; the official, then aware of the information before the
grand jury, gives a glib but plausible explanation; the prosecutor then
begins to investigate the version offered by the public official; evidence is then uncovered which renders the official's grand jury testimony implausible; the official is indicted; at trial the prosecution
adduces the evidence discovered after the official's grand jury testimony; the official takes the stand and gives a glib but plausible
explanation for the seemingly sinister conduct, this explanation being
totally at odds with the version given by the defendant during his
grand jury appearance. Here the defendant's grand jury testimony
should be admitted against him. Excluding such evidence effectively
blinds the fact-finder to the reality of the situation, that is: the witness
is unworthy of belief and will shape his alibi to whatever facts he is
aware the prosecution knows about at the time he is called upon to
testify.
Under West Virginia law, however, this prior grand jury testimony
of the defendant may not be admissible. 23 The prosecutor may, of
course, use the grand jury testimony and the trial testimony in a
subsequent perjury trial, 24 but what are the chances of this? If the

22. Compare State v. Cook, 72 S.E. 1025 (1911) (holding that the prosecution may impeach
a defendant through the use of testimony given by the defendant in an earlier trial in the same matter)
with State v. Price, 167 S.E. 862 (f. Va. 1933) (holding that a defendant's testimony before a justice
of the peace may not be used to impeach his trial testimony, even if the two are inconsistent).
23. W. VA. CODE § 57-2-3 (1966).
24. State v. Price, 167 S.E. 862 (f. Va. 1933).
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prosecutor has won the case, the point is almost moot. The falsity
of the defendant's story is manifest to the public and the defendant
will be sentenced by the court who will also be aware of the defendant's contemptuous testimony. Further prosecution is overkill. If the
prosecutor loses her case, there are several extra-legal, but quite real
reasons why a perjury prosecution based on the conflict between the
official's grand jury testimony and his trial testimony will not be
pursued. There is a tide in the affairs of men. The prosecutor has
taken a big political risk in indicting this powerful person in the first
place, she has invested untold effort and emotion into the case; whatever support she may have had for the case has probably waned.
Even if the prosecutor has the emotional mettle to try it again, she
must ask herself how her chances of winning a second prosecution
have been affected by the loss of the first. Will the court see the
effort as vindictive, desperate, overzealous? What about the jury?
The public?
Admittedly, there is some superficial appeal to this doctrine. There
we have echoes of the Fifth Amendment's proscription against compulsory self-incrimination. However, the law could protect this right
just as completely and effectively without issuing such a blank check
to everyone who takes the witness stand. Any concerns about a possible chilling effect on Fifth Amendment rights could be satisfied by
requiring the prosecutor to inform the grand jury witness of those
rights, on the record, before substantive questioning begins like police
officers are required to give Miranda-type warnings. Thus, the witness
would be told that she could refuse to answer any self-incriminating
question and that she has the right to retain an attorney with whom
she could consult regarding her appearance and the questions being
asked of her. Any such witness would thereby be given fair warning.
Those who felt at risk could simply refuse to answer; they would be
protected as the Constitution contemplates.
Others, knowing themselves to have criminal exposure, will nevertheless dive blithely into the question and answer session with the
prosecutor. These witnesses believe they can lie their way out of their
criminal liability. This class of people (and experienced corruption
prosecutors will invariably testify that this is a very large class of
people) should be afforded no protection against their own testimony.
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While state law allows false grand jury testimony to be used against
the witness in a prosecution for perjury or false swearing, testimony
of this kind is most often revealed to be false during the trial of the
witness for the substantive offense about which he testified.
The ability of the county prosecutor to properly employ a grand
jury in a search for truth, and thus to conduct effective corruption
investigations, would be enhanced by allowing her to use a defendant's false .grand jury testimony against him at trial. A witness's
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination can
be adequately protected through the system of warnings outlined
above.
West Virginia law also allows a defendant in a criminal case a
severance from other defendants as a matter of right. 6 This provision
not only strains the already limited resources of the county prosecutor
(where there are three defendants charged in a single criminal scheme,
there must be three trials the prosecutor must spend three weeks, not
one, in her trial mode, interviewing and preparing witnesses to all
hours of the night, the judge will have to hear the same evidence
three times, the frightened witnesses will have to face those whom
they accuse, often reluctantly, three times), it also may prevent the
prosecutor from getting her whole case before the jury in each of
the trials.
Federal standards for severance allow joint trials of several defendants charged in the same scheme. If joinder is otherwise legally
proper, 27 a defendant is only granted severance from other defendants
where he can show that he would suffer undue prejudice in a joint
trial. 28 The federal rule requires the trial court to weigh the interests
of the government in economy of resources against the defendant's
interest in a separate trial. These various procedural reforms would
make the state system more responsive to its purpose - the interests
of justice in ways that have already been determined to be consistent

25.
26.
27.
28.

W. VA.
W. VA.
FED. R.
FED. R.

CODE § 57-2-3 (1966).
R. CRIM. P. 14.
CRiM. P. 8(b).
CRIM. P. 14.
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with the fights of defendants: each proposed reform has long been
a basic part of the federal criminal justice system for years.
The State might also consider the creation of some statewide prosecuting authority. In many states such authority is vested in the Attorney General. There is no apparent constitutional impediment to
so empowering the Attorney General. A look to other state codes
would provide models for empowering legislation; a study of the experience of those states should provide some insight into the wisdom
of the approach they have taken.
On the other hand, the state could create a new office with statewide prosecutorial authority. The challenge would be to create an
office which is independent enough of the political system to be effective, yet responsible to the body politic. A prosecutor, particularly
a prosecutor whose primary function is to investigate and prosecute
public corruption-type offenses, cannot be effective if she must always
be watching her back. If her tenure in office is at the will and pleasure
of some elected official, she will be impotent to reach the misdeeds
of that particular person and his allies. Likewise, if her budget her staff and resources - are controlled directly by those whom she
29
may prosecute, she faces an insurmountable task.
Yet she cannot be completely autonomous. She, like every. other
officer in the republic, must be subject to some check and balance
within government and ultimately responsible to the body politic.
Such a prosecutor could be appointed to serve a term which would
be staggered with the governor. For example, a 10-year term would
not coincide with any governor's or other public official's term and
would be -long enough to allow for independence and experience.
Moreover, assuming a multiple-attorney staff, the staff attorneys would
be treated like civil service employees and would not be subject to
removal upon a change in administration.
Any such statewide prosecutor should be given the authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses carried out in multiple counties.

29. Reminiscent of Archibald Cox's prosecution of executive branch officials involved in the
Watergate break-in.
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She should be given authority to investigate and indict public officials
and their agents in grand juries convened in counties other than those
where the target is an official.
Finally, such an office should be funded in a way to attract experienced and qualified people. Perhaps salary ranges could be tied
to those paid to similar office-holders in the federal system.
In sum, reform could be made in the authority given to special
prosecutors and in the method by which they are chosen. The autonomy necessary for prosecutorial effectiveness versus the need for
institutional checks on all governmental power and a final responsibility to the electorate comprise the competing interests.
Any such empowering legislation should include standards insuring that an appointee is experienced, qualified, and without bias.
Thought should be given to employing several branches of government in the selection process. Perhaps a disinterested trial judge or
members of the ethics commission could play a role in the selection
process. The goal, of course, is to eliminate pressure on the prosecutor
from individual politicians, parties, or factions.
There are those who would criticize these various reforms as an
undue expansion of government. In particular, to the extent these
reforms result in more convictions and more aggressive prosecution,
some elements of the defense bar may object. The criminal defense
bar unquestionably plays a crucial role in the protection of individual
rights and liberties not only on a case-by-case basis but also in the
formulation of law and policy. This effort is quite legitimate and
should be applauded. However there are other societal interests such
as order, public decency, safety, and fairness in commerce which are
not the first concern of the criminal defense bar and which should
not be underrepresented. The vindication of the rights of the weak
and oppressed is not always accomplished by extending procedural
protections to criminal defendants or by insuring the limitation of
prosecutorial power. This is especially true in the area of public corruption, where the class of defendants who benefit from ineffective
prosecution or irrational procedural hurdles are the most powerful
members of society. As sadly demonstrated by the West Virginia and
nationwide experience, the victims of public prosecutorial ineffec-
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tiveness consist of ordinary folk denied fair elections, fair competition
in the marketplace, fair taxation, fair distribution of public resources,
and fair administration of justice by public office holders.
II.

CONCLUSION

The corruption of public officials is a serious problem in our state.
The fact that non-federal prosecutions of office-holders are so rare
indicates a need for reform in the State criminal justice system. Any
such reform, to be meaningful, will carry a price tag. However, failure
to act out of a sense of hopelessness or bankruptcy is an abdication
of responsibility and a cynical expression of disbelief in the State's
ability to govern itself. There is work to be done here, and responsible
government-government that seeks protection for the weak and the
oppressed-will do it. Whether the state or the federal government
accomplish this task depends on the state's willingness to respond
effectively to the obvious need.
An organized response to the problem of corruption is a refinement of -

or move toward -

democracy. The idea is to restore or

maintain some measure of trust in the integrity of government institutions, to ensure that what is done in secret will be brought to
light, and to guarantee that decisions affecting the public will not be
tainted by self-interest. These goals are not high-minded rhetoric; vigorous pursuit of them is absolutely necessary to the life of a functioning democracy. In the final analysis, those who value liberty ignore
these goals at their peril. Justice may be expensive, but its value far
outweighs its cost.
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